Evolutionary Finance and Dynamic Games by Hens, Thorsten et al.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1536724
 
 
 
 
 
Swiss Finance Institute 
Research Paper Series N°09 – 49
 
Evolutionary Finance and Dynamic 
Games
   
 
Rabah AMIR
 
University of Arizona
 
Igor V. Evstigneev
 
University of Manchester
 
 
Thorsten Hens
 
University of Zurich and Swiss Finance Institute
 
 
Le XU
 
University of Manchester 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1536724
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Established at the initiative of the Swiss Bankers' Association, the Swiss 
Finance Institute is a private foundation funded by the Swiss banks and 
SWX. It merges 3 existing foundations: the International Center FAME, the 
Swiss Banking School and the Stiftung "Banking and Finance" in Zurich. 
With its university partners, the Swiss Finance Institute pursues the 
objective of forming a competence center in banking and finance 
commensurate to the importance of the Swiss financial center. It will be 
active in research, doctoral training and executive education while also 
proposing activities fostering interactions between academia and the 
industry. The Swiss Finance Institute supports and promotes promising 
research projects in selected subject areas. It develops its activity in 
complete symbiosis with the NCCR FinRisk.
 
The National Centre of Competence in Research “Financial Valuation and 
Risk Management” (FinRisk) was launched in 2001 by the Swiss National 
Science Foundation (SNSF). FinRisk constitutes an academic forum that 
fosters cutting-edge finance research, education of highly qualified finance 
specialists at the doctoral level and knowledge transfer between finance 
academics and practitioners. It is managed from the University of Zurich and 
includes various academic institutions from Geneva, Lausanne, Lugano, 
St.Gallen and Zurich. For more information see www.nccr-finrisk.ch . 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded without charge from the Swiss Finance 
Institute Research Paper Series hosted on the Social Science Research 
Network electronic library at:  
 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1536724
 
 
 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1536724
EVOLUTIONARY FINANCE AND DYNAMIC
GAMES
Rabah Amira, Igor V. Evstigneevb, Thorsten Hensc and Le Xub
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. The focus of the study. In this paper we examine a game-
theoretic dynamic model of an asset market with endogenous equilibrium
asset prices. The evolution of the market is determined by the dynamic in-
teraction of the strategies of investors. The investors use general, adaptive
strategies (portfolio rules), distributing their wealth between assets in given
proportions depending on the observed exogenous random factors and the
history of the market. Randomness is modeled in terms of a discrete-time
stochastic process of states of the worldwith a given probability distri-
bution. Assets pay dividends depending on the realization of this process.
The dividends together with capital gains form tradersbudgets, which are
partially consumed and partially reinvested. A strategy prole of investors
determines the process of market dynamics with equilibrium asset prices de-
rived from a short run equilibrium of supply and demand. This random
dynamical system generates a path of the unfolding simultaneous-move N -
player stochastic game, which results in an outcome of the game characterized
by a sequence of time-dependent market shares (fractions of total wealth) of
each of the traders.
The main goal of the study is to identify strategies allowing an investor to
survivein the market selection process, i.e. to maintain a positive, bounded
away from zero, share of total wealth over the innite time horizon, irrespec-
tive of the portfolio rules used by the other traders. We construct a strategy,
generalizing Kellys (1956) well-known portfolio rule of betting your beliefs,
which possesses this remarkable property of unconditional survival. More-
over, we show that the strategy possessing this property is essentially unique:
any other strategy of this kind (belonging to a certain class) is asymptotically
similar to the Kelly rule. The result on asymptotic uniqueness we obtain may
be regarded as an analogue of turnpike theorems1, stating that all optimal
or quasi-optimal paths of economic dynamics converge to each other in the
long run.
1See, e.g., Nikaido (1968) and McKenzie (1986).
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1.2. Evolutionary nance. The model we consider is a game-theoretic
version of the evolutionary model of a nancial market with long-lived dividend-
paying assets developed in Evstigneev et al. (2006, 2008, 2009). The gen-
eral approach underlying this direction of work is to apply evolutionary
dynamics mutation and selection to the analysis of the long-run perfor-
mance of investment strategies (portfolio rules). A stock market is under-
stood as a heterogeneous population of frequently interacting portfolio rules
in competition for market capital. The ultimate goal is to build a Darwinian
theoryof portfolio selection.
Evolutionary ideas have a long history in the social sciences going back to
Malthus, who played an inspirational role for Darwin (for a review of the sub-
ject see, e.g., Hodgeson (1993). A more recent stage of development of these
ideas began in the 1950s with the publications of Alchian (1950) and others.
An important role in this area has been played by the studies by Arthur, Hol-
land, LeBaron, Palmer and Taylor (1997), Farmer and Lo (1999), LeBaron,
Arthur and Palmer (1999), Blume and Easley (1992), Brock, Hommes and
Wagener (2005) and Lux (2009).
Although the above studies provided a starting point for our line of re-
search, our approach to evolutionary nance is di¤erent from theirs not only
in the modeling frameworks and in the specic problems analyzed, but also
in the general objectives of work. In particular, we deal with models based on
random dynamical systems, rather than on the conventional general equilib-
rium settings where agents maximize discounted sums of expected utilities.
The emphasis is on nding explicit formulas for surviving portfolio rules with
the view to making the theory closer to practical applications. In contrast
with a number of the above-mentioned papers, we use the rigorous mathemat-
ical approach, rather than computer simulations, to justify our conclusions.
Considerable e¤orts are aimed at obtaining results in most general situations,
without imposing restrictive assumptions to simplify the analysis. This re-
quires the consideration of models having a rich mathematical structure and
exploiting advanced mathematical tools.
In our work, the principal objective of the evolutionary approach consists
in developing new models that would constitute a plausible alternative to
conventional general equilibrium. One of the most commonly used equilib-
rium frameworks is that proposed by Radner (1972) involving agentsplans,
prices and price expectations. A well-known drawback of that framework is
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the necessity of agentsperfect foresight to establish an equilibrium.2 In
particular, the market participants have to agree on the future prices for each
of the possible future realizations of the states of the world (without knowing
which particular state will be realized). This approach di¤ers radically from
the one based on the present evolutionary model. Here, only historical ob-
servations and the current state of the world inuence current behavior; no
agreement about the future market structure is required and no coordinated
actions of the agents are assumed.
Another important distinction between our approach and the conven-
tional general equilibrium paradigm lies in the data of the model we assume
to be given. We avoid using unobservable agentscharacteristics such as in-
dividual utilities or subjective beliefs. The models we deal with are robust
with respect to changes in such characteristics. The individual goals of in-
vestors are described in terms of properties (survival, evolutionary stability,
etc.) holding almost surely, rather than in terms of the maximization of ex-
pected utilities. We consider this, robust, modelling approach as the basis
for developing a new generation of dynamic equilibrium models, that could
be used for practical quantitative recommendations applicable in nancial
industry.
In the general economics perspective, the present class of models has its
roots in the Marshallian (1949) principle of temporary equilibrium (not to
be confused with a di¤erent concept of temporary equilibrium due to Hicks,
Lindahl and others  see, e.g. Grandmont 1988). The ideas of Marshall
were developed in the framework of mathematical models in economics by
Samuelson (1947, pp. 321323). A key hypothesis needed to study the process
of market dynamics by using the Marshallian moving equilibrium method,
is the co-existence of at least two sets of economic variables changing with
di¤erent speeds. Then the set of variables changing slower (in our model,
the set of investorsportfolios) can be temporarily xed, while the other (in
our case, the asset prices) can be assumed to rapidly reach the unique state
of short-run equilibrium. For a comprehensive analysis of this approach see
Schlicht (1985); in the context of evolutionary nance this modeling principle
is discussed in detail in Evstigneev et al. (2008, 2009).
1.3. Evolutionary nance and game theory. Game theory has
2For discussions of this circle of questions see La¤ont (1989) and Dubey et al. (1987).
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become one of the main general tools in mathematics-based research in Eco-
nomics and Finance. As such, the model we consider in this paper ts into
the broad paradigm of the applications of noncooperative game theory to
the study of market behavior and can be linked to several distinct strands of
literature related to this paradigm. We discuss these links below, by stressing
both the common aspects and the key di¤erences between the present model
and each of these areas.
We refer, rst of all, to the strand of literature on strategic market games
initiated by Shapley and Shubik (Shubik 1972, Shapley and Shubik 1977)
and then developed in various directions by several authors. In particular,
Sahi and Yao (1989) and Amir et al. (1990) study models that do not rely
on a commodity money, and are thus closer to the present study than others.
Identifying our assets with standard commodities, one round of play in the
present model shares some important features with static market games of the
ShapleyShubik type. In particular, given playersstrategies, the endogenous
price formation rule depends only on aggregates and involves setting the
value of supply equal to the value of demand for each asset, as the market-
clearing condition. All ows across traders are mediated via the market
clearing prices. In the way of di¤erences, our model is more easily amenable
to dynamic analysis than standard market games for a number of reasons. In
particular, wealth is the only critical variable to keep track of for each agent,
there is no need for a commodity money in its dual role as medium of trade
and utility-bearing commodity, and one naturally avoids the usual modeling
dilemma of how to deal with at money, given that it might introduce end-
of-period e¤ects by being worthless in any last period.
The central concept in the contemporary game theory is that of Nash
equilibrium. One fundamental divergence of the present work with the con-
ventional game-theoretic ideology lies in our very solution concept, the notion
of a survival strategy. This notion does not explicitly involve a Nash equi-
librium of any kind, nor does it entail a specication of payo¤ functions or
preference relations that rational players in the market game would aim to
maximize. What matters here is only the ability of a portfolio rule to guar-
antee a uniformly strictly positive share of market wealth in the long run, i.e.
survival. As we emphasized above, a characteristic feature of this approach
is that it relies only on model primitives that are observable and can be es-
timated empirically. This makes the theory closer to reality, where typically
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quantitative information about investors utilities is lacking. In addition,
investors strategic behavior often is not fully expressible in terms of the
maximization of the utility of consumption. Rather, it may involve satisc-
ing, simple rules of thumb based on experience, and other behavioral notions.
Moreover, investors might have goals not directly reducible to consumption
(winning in competition, dominating a market segment, etc.).
Our notion of a survival strategy links the present work to the classical
studies of games of survival pioneered by Milnor and Shapley (1957).3 These
zero-sum games represent a natural two-player generalization of the classical
gamblers ruin problem (Dubins and Savage, 1965). The focus is on Nash
equilibria (or minmax/maxmin strategies) that are dened in terms of the
probabilities of survival, which is understood in that context, in contrast with
this paper, as avoiding bankruptcy at a random (nite) moment of time.
As our solution concept relies solely on the notion of long-run survival, it
places emphasis on the tness of playersstrategies, rather than on players
payo¤s or preferences. As such, it is somewhat reminiscent of various notions
of evolutionary stable strategies in evolutionary game theory, including the
celebrated concept by Maynard Smith (1982), asymptotically stable steady
states of replicator dynamics processes (Samuelson, 1997), and others. How-
ever, no notions or results of the conventional evolutionary game theory are
directly employed in this work. In spite of the similar general focus on issues
of survival and extinction in selection processes, there is a crucial distinction
between our approach and the aforementioned concepts. The latter are typ-
ically based on a given static game and random matching in a population
of players, in terms of which an evolutionary process leading to survival or
extinction of its participants is dened. Our notion of survival is dened in
the original terms of the dynamic game describing wealth accumulation of
investors, which makes it possible to address directly those questions that
are of interest in the context of the modeling of asset market dynamics.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the model.
Section 3 states the main results (Theorems 1 and 2). Section 4 outlines a
general plan of the proof of the results. The Appendix contains technical
details of the proofs.
3See also Luce and Rai¤a (1989, section A8.4) and Maitra and Sudderth (1996, section
7.16).
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2. THE MODEL
2.1. Asset market. We consider a market where K  2 assets are
traded. The market is inuenced by random factors modeled in terms of
an exogenous stochastic process s1; s2; :::, where st is a random element of
a measurable space St. At each date t = 1; 2; ::: assets k = 1; 2; :::; K pay
dividends Dt;k(st)  0 depending on the history
st := (s1; :::; st)
of states of the world up to date t. The functions Dt;k(st) are measurable
and satisfy
KX
k=1
Dt;k(s
t) > 0 for all t; st: (1)
This condition means that at each date in each random situation at least one
asset yields a strictly positive dividend. The total amount (the number of
units) of asset k available in the market at date t is Vt;k(st) > 0. For t = 0,
Vt;k is a constant number, and for t  1, Vt;k(st) is a measurable function of
st.
We denote by pt 2 RK+ the vector of market prices of the assets. For each
k = 1; :::; K, the coordinate pt;k of pt = (pt;1; :::; pt;K) stands for the price of
one unit of asset k at date t. There are N  2 investors (traders) acting
in the market. A portfolio of investor i at date t = 0; 1; ::: is specied by
a vector xit = (x
i
t;1; :::; x
i
t;K) 2 RK+ where xit;k is the amount (the number of
units) of asset k in the portfolio xit. The scalar product hpt; xiti =
PK
k=1 pt;kx
i
t;k
expresses the value of the investor is portfolio xit at date t in terms of the
prices pt;k. The state of the market at each date t is characterized by the set
of vectors (pt; x1t ; :::; x
N
t ), where pt is the price vector and x
1
t ; :::; x
N
t are the
tradersportfolios.
At date t = 0 the investors have initial endowments wi0 > 0 (i =
1; 2; :::; N) that form their budgets at date 0. Investor is budget at date
t  1 is hDt(st)+pt; xit 1i, where Dt(st) := (Dt;1(st); :::; Dt;K(st)). It consists
of two components: the dividends hDt(st); xit 1i paid by the portfolio xit 1
and the market value hpt; xit 1i of the portfolio xit 1 expressed in terms of the
todays prices pt. A fraction t = t(st) of the budget is invested into assets.
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We will assume that the investment rate 0 < t(st) < 1 is the same for all the
traders, although it may depend on time and random factors. The number
1   t can represent the tax rate or the consumption rate. The assumption
that 1   t is the same for all the investors is quite natural in the former
case. In the latter case it is indispensable since we focus in this work on
the analysis of the comparative performance of trading strategies (portfolio
rules) in the long run. Without this assumption, an analysis of this kind does
not make sense: a seemingly worse performance of a portfolio rule in the long
run might be simply due to a higher consumption rate of the investor.
We shall suppose that the function t(st) is measurable (for t = 0 it is
constant) and satises the following condition:
t(s
t) < Vt;k(s
t)=Vt 1;k(st 1): (2)
This condition holds, in particular, when the total mass Vt;k(st) of each asset
k does not decrease, i.e. when the right-hand side of (2) is not less than one.
But (2) does not exclude the situation when Vt;k decreases at some rate, not
faster than t.
2.2. Investment strategies. For each t  0, every trader i = 1; 2; :::; N
selects a vector of investment proportions it = (
i
t;1; :::; 
i
t;K) according to
which he/she plans to distribute the available budget between assets. Vectors
it belong to the unit simplex
K := f(a1; :::; aK)  0 : a1 + :::+ aK = 1g:
In terms of the game we deal with, the vectors it represent the players
(investors) actions or control variables. The investment proportions at each
date t  0 are selected by the N traders simultaneously and independently,
so that we deal here with a simultaneous-move N -person dynamic game.
For t  1, players actions might depend, generally, on the history st =
(s1; :::; st) of the process of states of the world and the history of the game
(pt 1; xt 1; t 1), where pt 1 = (p0; :::; pt 1) is the sequence of asset price
vectors up to time t  1, and
xt 1 := (x0; x1; :::; xt 1); xl = (x1l ; :::; x
N
l );
t 1 = (0; 1; :::; t 1); l = (1l ; :::; 
N
l );
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are the sets of vectors describing the portfolios and the investment propor-
tions of all the traders at all the dates up to t  1. The history of the game
contains information about the market history the sequence (p0; x0); :::,
(pt 1; xt 1) of the states of the market and about the actions il of all the
players (investors) i = 1; :::; N at all the dates l = 0; :::; t   1. A vector
i0 2 K and a sequence of measurable functions with values in K
it(s
t; pt 1; xt 1; t 1); t = 1; 2; :::
form an investment (trading) strategy i of trader i, specifying a portfolio
rule according to which trader i selects investment proportions at each date
t  0. This is a general game-theoretic denition of a strategy, assuming full
information about the history of the game, including the playersprevious
actions, and the knowledge of all the past and present states of the world.
Among general portfolio rules, we will distinguish those for which it
depends only on st, and not on the market history (pt 1; xt 1; t 1). We will
call such portfolio rules basic. They play an important role in the present
work: the survival strategy we construct belongs to this class.
2.3. Dynamic equilibrium. Suppose that at date 0 each investor i has
selected some investment proportions i0 = (
i
0;1; :::; 
i
0;K) 2 K . Then the
amount invested in asset k by trader i is 0i0;kw
i
0 and the total amount in-
vested in asset k is 0
PN
i=1 
i
0;kw
i
0. It is assumed that the market is always in
equilibrium (asset supply is equal to asset demand), which makes it possible
to determine the equilibrium price p0;k of each asset k from the equations
p0;kV0;k = 0
NX
i=1
i0;kw
i
0; k = 1; 2; :::; K: (3)
On the left-hand side of (3) we have the total value p0;kV0;k of all the assets
of the type k in the market (recall that the amount of each asset k at date 0
is V0;k). The right-hand side represents the total wealth invested in asset k
by all the investors. Equilibrium implies the equality in (3). The investment
proportions i0 = (
i
0;1; :::; 
i
0;K) chosen by the traders at date 0 determine
their portfolios xi0 = (x
i
0;1; :::; x
i
0;K) at date 0 by the formula
xi0;k =
0
i
0;kw
i
0
p0;k
; k = 1; 2; :::; K; i = 1; :::; N: (4)
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This formula states that the current market value p0;kxi0;k of the kth position
of the portfolio xi0 of investor i is equal to the fraction 
i
0;k of the is investment
budget 0wi0.
Assume now that all the investors have chosen their investment propor-
tion vectors it = (
i
t;1; :::; 
i
t;K) at date t  1. Then the equilibrium of asset
supply and demand determines the market clearing prices
pt;kVt;k = t
NX
i=1
it;khDt(st) + pt; xit 1i; k = 1; :::; K: (5)
The investment budgets thDt(st)+ pt; xit 1i of the traders i = 1; 2; :::; N are
distributed between assets in the proportions it;k, so that the kth position
of the trader is portfolio xit = (x
i
t;1; :::; x
i
t;K) is
xit;k =
t
i
t;khDt(st) + pt; xit 1i
pt;k
; k = 1; :::; K; i = 1; :::; N: (6)
Note that the price vector pt is determined implicitly as the solution to the
system of equations (5). It can be shown that under assumption (2) a non-
negative vector pt satisfying these equations exists and is unique (for any st
and any feasible xit 1 and 
i
t) see Proposition 1 in Section 4.
Given a strategy prole (1; :::;N) of investors and their initial endow-
ments w10; :::; w
N
0 , we can generate a path of the market game by setting
i0 = 
i
0; i = 1; :::; N; (7)
it = 
i
t(s
t; pt 1; xt 1; t 1); t = 1; 2; :::; i = 1; :::; N; (8)
and by dening pt and xit recursively according equations (3)(6). The ran-
dom dynamical system described denes step by step the vectors of invest-
ment proportions it(s
t), the equilibrium prices pt(st) and the investorsport-
folios xit(s
t) as measurable vector functions of st for each moment of time
t  0 (for t = 0 these vectors are constant). Thus we obtain a random path
of the game
(pt(s
t);x1t (s
t); :::; xNt (s
t);1t (s
t); :::; Nt (s
t)); (9)
as a vector stochastic process in RK+  RKN+  RKN+ .
The above description of asset market dynamics requires clarication.
Equations (4) and (6) make sense only if pt;k > 0, or equivalently, if the
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aggregate demand for each asset (under the equilibrium prices) is strictly
positive. Those strategy proles which guarantee that the recursive proce-
dure described above leads at each step to strictly positive equilibrium prices
will be called admissible. In what follows, we will deal only with such strat-
egy proles. The hypothesis of admissibility guarantees that the random
dynamical system under consideration is well-dened. Under this hypothe-
sis, we obtain by induction that on the equilibrium path all the portfolios
xit = (x
i
t;1; :::; x
i
t;K) are non-zero and the wealth
wit := hDt + pt; xit 1i (10)
of each investor is strictly positive. Further, by summing up equations (6)
over i = 1; :::; N , we nd that
NX
i=1
xit;k =
PN
i=1 t
i
t;khDt + pt; xit 1i
pt;k
=
pt;kVt;k
pt;k
= Vt;k (11)
(the market clears) for every asset k and each date t  1. The analogous
relations for t = 0 can be obtained by summing up equations (4). Thus for
every equilibrium state of the market (pt; x1t ; :::; x
N
t ), we have pt > 0, x
i
t 6= 0
and (11).
We give a simple su¢ cient condition for a strategy prole to be admissible.
This condition will hold for all the strategy proles we shall deal with in the
present paper, and in this sense it does not restrict generality. Suppose that
some trader, say trader 1, uses a portfolio rule that always prescribes to invest
into all the assets in strictly positive proportions 1t;k. Then a strategy prole
containing this portfolio rule is admissible. Indeed, for t = 0, we get from
(3) that p0;k  0V  10;k 10;kw10 > 0 and from (4) that x10 = (x10;1; :::; x10;K) > 0
(coordinatewise). Assuming that x1t 1 > 0 and arguing by induction, we
obtain hDt + pt; x1t 1i  hDt; x1t 1i > 0 in view of (1), which in turn yields
pt > 0 and x1t > 0 by virtue of (5) and (6), as long as 
1
t;k > 0.
2.4. Comments on the model. An essential feature of the model
we consider is the description of trading strategies in terms of investment
proportions. This setting reects the principle of active portfolio manage-
ment (antipodal to a passive, buy-and-hold strategy). In this framework,
even the most passive strategy prescribing asset allocation in constant,
time-independent, proportions requires a periodic rebalancing of the port-
folio with the view to adjusting the weights of di¤erent assets in accordance
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with changing relative prices. Although this modeling approach is in sharp
contrast with the conventional general equilibrium framework, where port-
folio positions are typically specied in terms of physical units of assets
(see e.g. Magill and Quinzii 1996), it prevails in quantitative nance theory
and especially in nancial practice. Recommendations that fund managers
or commercial nance software provide are stated in terms of investment
proportions, or portfolio weights; they give an answer to the question what
fraction of your wealth to allocate to one asset or another, rather than how
many units of each asset to buy. Of course in a static setting when the prices
are known, these two questions are equivalent, which is not the case in a
dynamic framework, especially when the mechanism of asset price formation
is endogenous.
The most commonly used method of quantitative fund management pre-
scribes to select investment proportions, specifying the structure of asset al-
location, and then to maintain these proportions over a certain time period.4
In our setting, these proportions are maintained during each of the time pe-
riods (t   1; t]. In practice, an investor who has decided to keep a certain
asset allocation structure rebalances his/her portfolio on a periodic basis, say
monthly, or when a substantial deviation (exceeding some xed percentage)
from the given proportions occurs owing to changes in asset prices. Then the
investor sells those assets which are overweighted in the portfolio and buys
those which are underweighted, and thus restores the initial balance. This
process is assumed to lead in our model to a short-run equilibrium over each
time period (t  1; t].
The model does not describe in detail how the above process goes within
each of the time periods (t  1; t] (or their subperiods, when the portfolio re-
balancing takes place). The generality of our framework makes it possible to
admit a whole spectrum of mechanisms leading to an equilibrium in a short-
run. In reality, various auction-type mechanisms are used for the purpose
of equilibrating bids and o¤ers, resulting in market clearing. For example,
the major European stock exchanges Euronext (Paris) and Xetra (Frankfurt)
use computerised systems relying upon batch auctions see, e.g., Ho¤mann
and van Bommel (2009). An analysis of several types of such mechanisms
and their implications for the structure of trading in nancial markets is
4See, e.g., Dempster et al. (2009).
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performed by Bottazzi et al. (2005).
The design of asset allocation structures requires an appropriate techni-
cal analysis. Theoretical studies trying to explain Why you should rebal-
ance your portfolio(as Beutow et. al. entitled their 2002 paper) basically
conclude that a disciplined rebalancing strategy can add value; see also
Michaud (1998) and Plaxco and Arnott (2002). The nance literature de-
rives this conclusion, basically, from heuristics and empirical analysis. A
rigorous mathematical theory revealing the role of volatility in the endoge-
nous growth of xed-mix rebalancing strategies is developed in Dempster et
al. (2007).
The language of investment proportions provides a formal setting most
suitable for the specication of asset allocations and portfolio rebalancing.
At the same time, this approach has its own drawbacks. One of those is the
di¢ culty of the representation of some portfolio rules that are quite naturally
dened in terms of physical unitsof assets (e.g. the buy-and-hold strategy)
in the framework of investment proportions. Since the mechanism of price
formation in our model is endogenous and all the players are market makers,
such a representation might require the knowledge of the portfolio weights of
all the investors, that are selected simultaneously and independently. How-
ever, both empirical evidence and theory (see the above references) suggest
that we do not lose much in this connection. Simple theoretical arguments
show that in a volatile market, the buy-and-hold strategy is quite often in-
ferior to any completely diversied constant-proportions strategy involving
periodic portfolio rebalancing see Dempster et al. (2008). Paradoxically, it
may happen that any strategy in the former class exhibits a negative growth
rate, while the growth rate of some strategies in the latter class is positive.
In our setting, the buy-and-hold strategy, if implemented, would be driven
out of the market by increasing numbers of assets (e.g. when t   > 1, see
(13) below), irrespective of the dynamics of their nancial values.
The model at hand, in its present form, does not aim at comparing the
performance of active and passive investment strategies. Its purpose is dif-
ferent: to reect in quantitative terms the process of active trading char-
acteristic for contemporary nancial industry and to develop a framework
more suitable in the present context than the conventional general equi-
librium theory. Extensions of the model focusing on other theoretical and
applied questions will constitute the subject of further research.
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3. THE MAIN RESULTS
3.1. The notion of survival. Let (1; :::;N) be an admissible strategy
prole of the investors. Consider the path (9) of the random dynamical
system generated by this strategy prole and the given initial endowments.
Let wit > 0 denote the investor is wealth available at date t  0. If t = 0,
then wi0 is a constant number, the initial endowment of investor i. If t  1,
then wit = w
i
t(s
t) is a measurable function of st given by formula (10). As we
have noted above, wit(s
t) > 0.
We are primarily interested in the long-run behavior of the relative wealth
or the market shares rit := w
i
t=Wt of the traders, where Wt :=
PN
i=1w
i
t is the
total market wealth. We shall say that the portfolio rule 1 (or investor 1
using it) survives with probability one if inft0 r1t > 0 almost surely (a.s.).
This means that for almost all realizations of the process of states of the world
s1; s2; :::, the market share of the rst investor is bounded away from zero by
a strictly positive random constant. Alternatively, we can dene survival by
the requirement that lim inft!1 r1t > 0, which is equivalent, as long as the
numbers r1t are strictly positive, to the condition that inft0 r
1
t > 0.
Let us say that a portfolio rule 1 is a survival strategy if investor 1 using
it survives with probability one regardless of what portfolio rules are used by
the other investors.
We can reformulate the notion of a survival strategy in terms of the wealth
processes wit (i = 1; 2; :::; N). Survival of a portfolio rule 
1 used by investor
1 means that w1t  c
PN
i=1w
i
t (a.s.), where c is a strictly positive random
constant. The last inequality holds if and only if
wit  Cw1t ; i = 1; :::; N; (a.s.); (12)
where C is some random constant. Property (12) expresses the fact that the
wealth of any investor i using any strategy i cannot grow asymptotically
faster than the wealth of investor 1 who uses the strategy 1. Thus, we
can say that the portfolio rule 1 is competitive: it cannot be beaten (in
terms of the asymptotic growth rate of wealth) in competition with any set
of strategies used by the investor 1s rivals.
3.2. The Kelly rule. Assume that the total mass of each asset grows
(or decreases) at the same rate t = t(st) > 0:
Vt;k=Vt 1;k = t (t  1): (13)
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Thus
Vt;k = t:::1Vk; (14)
where Vk > 0 (k = 1; 2; :::; K) are the initial amounts of the assets. In the
case of real dividend-paying assets involving long-term investments in the
real economy (e.g., real estate, transportation, media, infrastructure, etc.)
the above assumption means that the economic system under consideration
is on a balanced growth path.
Dene the relative dividends of the assets k = 1; :::; K by
Rt;k = Rt;k(s
t) :=
Dt;k(s
t)Vt 1;k(st 1)PK
m=1Dt;m(s
t)Vt 1;m(st 1)
; k = 1; :::; K; t  1;
and put Rt(st) = (Rt;1(st); :::; Rt;K(st)). By virtue of (14), we have
Rt;k(s
t) =
Dt;k(s
t)VkPK
m=1Dt;m(s
t)Vm
: (15)
Further, dene
t := t=t;
lt :=

1  t+l ; if l = 1;
lt := t+1t+2::::t+l 1(1  t+l); if l > 1;
(16)
and assume that
t < 1  ; (17)
where  is a strictly positive constant. Consider the portfolio rule  with
the vectors of investment proportions t (s
t) = (t;1(s
t); :::; t;K(s
t)) given by
t;k = Et
1X
l=1
ltRt+l;k ; (18)
where Et() = E(jst) is the conditional expectation given st. If t = 0, then
Et() = E0() stands for the unconditional expectation E(). In view of (17),
the series of random variables
1X
l=1
lt = (1  t+1) + t+1(1  t+2) + t+1t+2(1  t+3) + :::
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converges uniformly, and its sum is equal to one. Therefore the series of
random vectors
P1
l=1 
l
tRt+l;k in (18) converges uniformly to a random vector
belonging the unit simplex K , and so t;k is well-dened.
The portfolio rule specied by (18) prescribes to distribute wealth across
assets in accordance with the proportions of the expected ow of their dis-
counted future relative dividends. The discount factors lt are dened in
terms of the investment rate t and the growth rate t according to formula
(16). It should be emphasized that the investment proportions t;k(s
t) pre-
scribed by the portfolio rule  generally depend on time t and the sequence
of exogenous states of the world st = (s1; :::; st), but do not depend on the
history of the game (pt 1; xt 1; t 1), so that the strategy  is basic.
The strategy  is a generalization of the Kelly portfolio rule of bet-
ting your beliefs playing an important role in capital growth theory see
Kelly (1956), Breiman (1961), Algoet and Cover (1988), and Hakansson and
Ziemba (1995). If t =  is constant, then formula (18) can be written as
t;k = Et
1X
l=1
[(1  )l 1Rt+l;k]: (19)
Further, if the random elements st are independent and identically distrib-
uted (i.i.d.) and the relative dividends Rt;k(st) = Rk(st) depend only on the
current state st and do not explicitly depend on t, then EtRk(st+l) = ERk(st)
(l  1), and so
t;k = ERk(st); (20)
which means that the strategy  is formed by the sequence of constant
vectors (ER1(st); :::; ERK(st)) (independent of t and st). Note that in this
special case, the formula (20) for  does not involve the factor . In this
case, the beliefs at each date t are concerned simply with the expected
relative dividends (which do not depend on t), while in the general case, and
even when  is constant, one has to take into account the expected discounted
sum of all the relative dividends at all the future dates after t.
3.3. The Kelly rule is a survival strategy. Assume that for all k
and t,
Et
1X
l=1
ltRt+l;k > 0 (a.s.): (21)
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According to this assumption, the conditional expectation involved in the
denition of the investment proportions t;k (see (18)) is strictly positive with
probability one. Therefore we can select a version t;k(s
t) of this conditional
expectation that is strictly positive for all st. This version will be used in
the denition of the strategy  = (t ).
A central result is as follows.
Theorem 1: The portfolio rule  is a survival strategy.
This theorem extends to the setting of long-lived dividend-paying assets
an analogous result established in the framework of a model with one-period,
short-livedassets in Amir et al. (2008). That framework, studied also by
Blume and Easley (1992) and Amir et al. (2005), may be regarded as a
limiting case as  ! 0 (with constant t = ) of the one considered in the
present paper. In the case of short-lived assets, the version of the Kelly
rule that turns out to be a survival strategy is dened by the investment
proportions t;k = EtRt+1;k. These proportions are limits of those in (19)
as ! 0. The analysis of the model with long-lived assets in which general
strategies are allowed and no assumptions on the process of states of the world
are imposed is much more demanding. It requires a substantial generalization
of the concept of the Kelly portfolio rule, involving the discounting of the
future dividends, and it is based on new techniques (relying upon stochastic
Lyapunov functions) designed for the analysis of random dynamical systems
arising in connection with the dynamic market games at hand.
As we have noted above, if the states of the world st are i.i.d. and the
functions Rt;k(st) = Rk(st) depend only on st and do not explicitly depend
on t, then the investment proportions k = ERk(st) of the strategy 
 are
constant: they depend neither on time nor on the states of the world (such
strategies are called simple). A version of the asset market model with long-
lived assets in which all the investors use only simple portfolio rules and the
states of the world are i.i.d. is considered in Evstigneev et al. (2008). It is
shown in that context that the strategy  not only survives, but outperforms
all other simple strategies. Those investors who use  dominate the market,
i.e. gather in the limit total market wealth, while those who use simple
strategies distinct from  vanish: their market shares tend to zero with
probability one. This is not so in the model considered in the present paper,
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where general, not necessarily simple, portfolio rules are allowed. Here, -
investors survive, i.e. keep market shares bounded away from zero a.s., but
they do not necessarily dominate the market.
3.4. Asymptotic uniqueness of the survival strategy. As we have
already noted, the portfolio rule  belongs to the class of basic portfolio
rules: the investment proportions t (s
t) depend only on the history st of the
process of states of the world, and do not depend on the market history. The
following theorem shows that in this class the survival strategy  = (t ) is
essentially unique: any other basic survival strategy is asymptotically similar
to .
Theorem 2. If  = (t) is a basic survival strategy, then
1X
t=0
jjt   tjj2 <1 (a.s.): (22)
Here, we denote by jj  jj the Euclidean norm in a nite-dimensional space.
Theorem 2 is akin to various turnpike results in the theory of economic
dynamics, expressing the idea that all optimal or asymptotically optimal
paths of an economic system follow in the long run essentially the same route:
the turnpike (Nikaido 1968, McKenzie 1986). Survival strategies  can be
characterized by the property that the wealth wjt of any investor j cannot
grow innitely faster (with strictly positive probability) than the wealth of
investor i using . The class of such investment strategies is similar to the
class of goodpaths of economic dynamics, as introduced by Gale (1967)
 paths that cannot be innitely worse than the turnpike. Theorem 2
is a direct analogue of Gales turnpike theorem for good paths (Gale, 1967,
Theorem 8); for a stochastic version of this result see Arkin and Evstigneev
(1987, Chapter 4, Theorem 6).
Note that the class of basic strategies is su¢ cient in the following sense.
Any sequence of vectors rt = (r1t ; :::; r
N
t ) (rt = rt(s
t)) of market shares gen-
erated by some strategy prole (1; :::;N) can be generated by a strategy
prole (1t (s
t); :::; Nt (s
t)) consisting of basic portfolio rules. The correspond-
ing vector functions it(s
t) can be dened recursively by (7) and (8), using
(3)(6). Thus it is su¢ cient to prove Theorem 1 only for basic portfolio
rules; this will imply that the portfolio rule (18) survives in competition with
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any, not necessarily basic, strategies. Such considerations cannot be auto-
matically applied to the problem of asymptotic characterization of general
survival strategies. This problem remains open; it indicates an interesting
direction for further research.
4. MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS OF THE MODEL
4.1. Some auxiliary propositions. In this section we set out the
program of proving Theorems 1 and 2. The proofs are divided into several
steps which are described in several propositions and lemmas below. Based
on these auxiliary results, we present at the end of the section the nal steps
of the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2. Technical details of the derivation of the
auxiliary results are relegated to the Appendix.
The rst proposition establishes the existence and uniqueness of an equi-
librium price vector at each date t  0.
Proposition 1: Let assumption (2) hold. Let xt 1 = (x1t 1; :::; x
N
t 1) be
a set of vectors xit 1 2 RK+ satisfying (11). Then for any st there exists a
unique solution pt 2 RK+ to equations (5). This solution is measurable with
respect to all the parameters involved in (5).
In the next proposition, we derive a system of equations governing the
dynamics of the market shares of the investors given their admissible strategy
prole (1; :::;N). Consider the path (9) of the random dynamical system
generated by (1; :::;N) and the sequence of vectors rt = (r1t ; :::; r
N
t ), where
rit is the investor is market share at date t.
Proposition 2: The following equations hold:
rit+1 =
KX
k=1
[t+1ht+1;k; rt+1i+ (1  t+1)Rt+1;k]
it;kr
i
t
ht;k; rti ; (23)
i = 1; :::; N , t  0.
The next proposition shows that it is su¢ cient to prove Theorem 1 when
N = 2, i.e., the general model can be reduced to the case of two investors.
Dene
~2t;k =
2t;kr
2
t + :::+ 
N
t;kr
N
t
1  r1t
: (24)
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Note that 1  r1t = r2t + :::+ rNt > 0, and so ~2t;k is well-dened. Furthermore
KX
k=1
~2t;k =
r2t + :::+ r
N
t
1  r1t
= 1;
which means that the vector ~2t := (~
2
t;1; :::;
~2t;K) belongs to the unit simplex
K . Thus the sequence of vectors ~2t = ~
2
t (s
t) denes a portfolio rule, which
will be denoted by ~. Dene
~r1t = r
1
t ; ~r
2
t = 1  r1t ; ~rt = (~r1t ; ~r2t ); ~1t;k = 1t;k; ~t;k = (~1t;k; ~2t;k):
Proposition 3: We have
~rit+1 =
KX
k=1
[t+1h~t+1;k; ~rt+1i+ (1  t+1)Rt+1;k]
~it;k~r
i
t
h~t;k; ~rti
; i = 1; 2; t  0:
Thus in the model with two investors i = 1; 2 using the strategies  and
~, respectively, the market share ~r1t of the rst investor coincides with r
1
t
(coming from the original model) and the market share ~r2t of the second is
equal to 1  r1t .
Consider the model with two traders (N = 2) using strategies i =
(it;k(s
t)); i = 1; 2; and denote by zt the ratio r1t =r
2
t of their market shares.
Proposition 4: The process zt is governed by the following random dy-
namical system:
zt+1 = zt
PK
k=1[t+1
2
t+1;k + (1  t+1)Rt+1;k]
1t;k
1t;kzt + 
2
t;kPK
k=1[t+1
1
t+1;k + (1  t+1)Rt+1;k]
2t;k
1t;kzt + 
2
t;k
: (25)
In the next proposition, we derive an equation which can be used as an
equivalent denition of the portfolio rule .
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Proposition 5: The portfolio rule  = (t;k) satises
Et[t+1

t+1;k + (1  t+1)Rt+1;k] = t;k (a.s.): (26)
It can be shown (by using a contraction principle) that  is a unique
solution to (26), but this fact will not be needed in what follows.
4.2. The plan of the proof of Theorem 1 is as follows. Proposition
3 shows that we can consider, without loss of generality, the case of two
investors. This reduces the dimension of the original random dynamical
system from a generalN toN = 2. Proposition 4 describes a one-dimensional
system which governs the evolution of the ratio zt = r1t =r
2
t of the market
shares of the two investors, and thus reduces the dimension of the problem
to 1. Our goal is to show that the random sequence (zt) dened recursively
by (25) is bounded away from zero almost surely. To this end it turns out
to be convenient to take a step backand to increase the dimension to K
(the number of assets). Assuming that the rst trader uses the investment
proportions 1t;k = 

t;k(s
t) prescribed by the portfolio rule  and the second
trader employs investment proportions 2t;k = t;k(s
t) specied by some other
portfolio rule , we introduce the following change of variables
ykt = t;k=zt ; k = 1; :::; K; (27)
and dene yt := (y1t ; :::; y
K
t ). We examine the dynamics of the random vectors
yt = yt(s
t) implied by the system (25). The norm jytj :=
P
k jykt j of the
vector yt  0 is equal to
P
k(t;k=zt) = 1=zt, and what we need is to show
that 1=jytj is bounded away from zero a.s.. To prove this, we construct a
stochastic Lyapunov function a function of yt which forms a non-negative
supermartingale (t) along a path (yt) of the system at hand (see Lemma 3
below). By using the supermartingale convergence theorem, we prove that
the stochastic process t converges a.s., which implies that it is bounded a.s..
We complete the proof by showing that the boundedness of t implies that
zt = 1=jytj is bounded away from zero.
4.3. Some inequalities and supermartingale properties. We begin
the realization of the above plan with two lemmas containing inequalities
involving the variables ykt dened by (27). Dene the non-negative random
variables
Yt := ln(1 + jytj) =   ln r1t ; (28)
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Zt;k := ln(1 +
ykt
t;k
) = ln(1 +
r2tt;k
r1t

t;k
); Zt :=
KX
k=1
t;kZt;k; (29)
and put
Ut := Yt   Zt; (30)
Lemma 1: The following inequality holds:
t+1Zt+1 + (1  t+1)Yt+1 
KX
k=1
[t+1

t+1;k + (1  t+1)Rt+1;k]Zt;k: (31)
Lemma 2: We have
Ut =
KX
k=1
t;k ln
t;k
r1t

t;k + r
2
tt;k
 0: (32)
From the above results, we derive the following fact.
Lemma 3: The random sequence
t := tZt + (1  t)Yt (33)
is a non-negative supermartingale satisfying
t   Ett+1  (1  t)Ut: (34)
The following two lemmas will be used in proof of Theorem 2.
Lemma 4. Let t be a supermartingale such that inftEt >  1. Then
the series of non-negative random variables
P1
t=0(t Ett+1) converges a.s.
Lemma 5. For any vectors (a1; :::; aK) > 0 and (b1; :::; bK)  0 satisfyingP
ak =
P
bk = 1, the following inequality holds
KX
k=1
ak ln ak  
KX
k=1
ak ln bk  1
4
KX
k=1
(ak   bk)2: (35)
22
4.4. Proof of Theorem 1. Since t is a non-negative supermartingale,
the sequence t converges a.s., and hence it is bounded above a.s. by some
random constant C. This implies (see (33) and (17)) that (1 t)Yt  t  C
(a.s.), and so
  ln r1t = Yt  t=(1  t)  B (a.s.);
where B := C=. Therefore r1t  e B (a.s.). 
4.5. Proof of Theorem 2. Let  = (t) be a basic survival strategy.
Suppose that investors i = 1; 2; :::; N   1 use the strategy  = (t ) and
investor N uses . By summing up equations (23) with it = 

t over i =
1; :::; N   1, we obtain
r^1t+1 =
KX
k=1
[t+1(

t+1;kr^
1
t+1 + t+1;k(1  r^1t+1))+
(1  t+1)Rt+1;k]
t;kr^
1
t
t;kr^
1
t + t;k(1  r^1t )
:
where r^1t := r
1
t + ::: + r
N 1
t is the market share of the group of investors
i = 1; 2; :::; N   1 and 1   r^t = rNt is the market share of investor N . We
used here the fact that
ht;k; rti =
NX
i=1
it;kr
i
t =
N 1X
i=1
t;kr
i
t + t;kr
N
t =
t;k
N 1X
i=1
rit + t;kr
N
t = 

t;kr^
1
t + t;k(1  r^1t ):
Further, we have
1  r^1t+1 =
KX
k=1
[t+1(

t+1;kr^
1
t+1 + t+1;k(1  r^1t+1))+
(1  t+1)Rt+1;k] t;k(1  r^
1
t )
t;kr^
1
t + t;k(1  r^1t )
:
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Thus the dynamics of the market shares r^1t = r
1
t + :::+ r
N 1
t ; 1  r^1t = rNt is
exactly the same as the dynamics of the market shares r^1t ; r^
2
t = 1  r^1t of two
investors i = 1; 2 (N = 2) using the strategies (1t ) = (

t ) and (
2
t ) = (t),
respectively. Since (t) is a survival strategy, the random sequence rNt =
1  r^1t = r^2t is bounded away from zero almost surely.
Since investor 1 uses the strategy , by virtue of Lemma 3 the sequence
t dened by (33) is a non-negative supermartingale, and inequality (34)
holds. In view of Lemma 4, the series
P1
t=0(t   Ett+1) of non-negative
random variables converges a.s. The inequality
t   Ett+1  (1  t)
KX
k=1
t;k ln
t;k
r^1t

t;k + r^
2
tt;k
established in Lemmas 2 and 3 and assumption (17) imply that
1X
t=0
KX
k=1
t;k ln
t;k
r^1t

t;k + r^
2
tt;k
<1 (a.s.): (36)
Finally, we observe that
KX
k=1
t;k ln
t;k
r^1t

t;k + r^
2
tt;k
=
KX
k=1
t;k ln

t;k  
KX
k=1
t;k ln[r^
1
t

t;k + r^
2
tt;k] 
1
4
KX
k=1
[t;k   (1  r^2t )t;k   r^2tt;k]2 =
1
4
KX
k=1
(r^2t

t;k   r^2tt;k)2 =
1
4
(r^2t )
2
KX
k=1
(t;k   t;k)2 =
1
4
(r^2t )
2jjt   tjj2; (37)
(see (35)), where the sequence r^2t is bounded away from zero a.s., as long as
(t) is a survival strategy. Therefore
r^2t  c > 0 (a.s.); (38)
where c is a random constant. From relations (36)(38) we conclude that the
series
P1
t=0 jjt  tjj2 converges a.s., which completes the proof of Theorem
2. 
24
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1: Fix some t and st and consider the operator
transforming a vector p = (p1; :::; pK) 2 RK+ into the vector q = (q1; :::; qK) 2
RK+ with coordinates
qk = tV
 1
t;k
NX
i=1
it;khDt + p; xit 1i:
This operator is contracting in the norm jjpjjV :=
P
k jpkjVt 1;k. Indeed, by
virtue of (2) we have
~ := max
k=1;:::;K
ftVt 1;kV  1t;k g < 1;
and so
jjq   q0jjV =
KX
k=1
jqk   q0kjVt 1;k 
t
KX
k=1
Vt 1;kV  1t;k
NX
i=1
it;kjhp  p0; xit 1ij  ~
NX
i=1
KX
k=1
it;kjhp  p0; xit 1ij =
~
NX
i=1
jhp  p0; xit 1ij  ~
NX
i=1
KX
m=1
jpm   p0mjxit 1;m =
~
KX
m=1
NX
i=1
jpm   p0mjxit 1;m = ~
KX
m=1
jpm   p0mjVt 1;m = ~jjp  p0jjV ;
where the last but one equality follows from (11). By using the contrac-
tion principle, we obtain the existence, uniqueness and measurability of the
solution to (5). 
Proof of Proposition 2: From (5) and (6) we get
pt;k = V
 1
t;k t
NX
i=1
it;khpt +Dt; xit 1i =
tV
 1
t;k
NX
i=1
it;kw
i
t = tV
 1
t;k ht;k; wti; (39)
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xit;k =
Vt;k
i
t;kw
i
t
ht;k; wti ; (40)
where t  1, wt := (w1t ; :::; wNt ) and t;k := (1t;k; :::; Nt;k). The analogous
formulas for t = 0,
p0;k = 0V
 1
0;k h0;k; w0i; xi0;k =
V0;k
i
0;kw
i
0
h0;k; w0i ; (41)
follow from (3) and (4). Consequently, we have
wit+1 =
KX
k=1
(pt+1;k +Dt+1;k)x
i
t;k =
KX
k=1
(t+1
ht+1;k; wt+1i
Vt+1;k
+Dt+1;k)
Vt;k
i
t;kw
i
t
ht;k; wti =
KX
k=1
(t+1
ht+1;k; wt+1iVt;k
Vt+1;k
+Dt+1;kVt;k)
it;kw
i
t
ht;k; wti t  0: (42)
By summing up these equations over i = 1; :::; N , we obtain
Wt+1 =
KX
k=1
(t+1
ht+1;k; wt+1iVt;k
Vt+1;k
+Dt+1;kVt;k)
PN
i=1 
i
t;kw
i
t
ht;k; wti =
KX
k=1
(t+1
ht+1;k; wt+1iVt;k
Vt+1;k
+Dt+1;kVt;k):
As long as
Vt+1;k=Vt;k = t+1 > 0 (43)
(see (13)), we have
Wt+1 =
KX
k=1
(t+1
 1
t+1ht+1;k; wt+1i+Dt+1;kVt;k) =
KX
k=1
(t+1
 1
t+1ht+1;k; wt+1i+Dt+1;kVt;k) = t+1 1t+1Wt+1 +
KX
k=1
Dt+1;kVt;k :
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This implies the formula
Wt+1 =
1
1  t+1 1t+1
KX
m=1
Dt+1;mVt;m ; (44)
where t+1 1t+1 = t+1. From (42) and (43), we nd
wit+1 =
KX
k=1
(t+1ht+1;k; wt+1i+Dt+1;kVt;k)
it;kw
i
t
ht;k; wti t  0:
Dividing both sides of this equation by Wt+1 and using (44), we get
rit+1 =
KX
k=1
[t+1ht+1;k; rt+1i+ (1  t+1) Dt+1;kVt;kPK
m=1Dt+1;mVt;m
]
it;kw
i
t=Wt
ht;k; wti=Wt ;
which yields (23) by virtue of (13) and (15). 
Proof of Proposition 3: In view of (24) and (23) we have
r1t+1 =
KX
k=1
ft+1[1t+1;kr1t+1 + (1  r1t+1)~2t+1;k]+
(1  t+1)Rt+1;kg
1t;kr
1
t
1t;kr
1
t + (1  r1t )~2t;k
:
By summing up equations (23) over i = 2; :::; N , we nd
~r2t+1 = 1  r1t+1 =
KX
k=1
[t+1ht+1;k; rt+1i+ (1  t+1)Rt+1;k]
(1  r1t )~2t;k
ht;k; rti :
Thus we obtain
~r2t+1 =
KX
k=1
ft+1[1t+1;kr1t+1 + (1  r1t+1)~2t+1;k]+
(1  t+1)Rt+1;kg
(1  r1t )~2t;k
1t;kr
1
t + (1  r1t )~2t;k
;
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which completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 4: By using (23) with N = 2, we get
rit+1 =
KX
k=1
[t+1(
i
t+1;kr
i
t+1+
j
t+1;k(1  rit+1))+(1 t+1)Rt+1;k]
it;kr
i
t
it;kr
i
t + 
j
t;kr
j
t
;
where i; j 2 f1; 2g and i 6= j. Setting Cijt;k := it;krit=(it;krit+jt;krjt ), we obtain
rit+1[1 + t+1
KX
k=1
(jt+1;k   it+1;k)Cijt;k] =
KX
k=1
[t+1
j
t+1;k + (1  t+1)Rt+1;k]Cijt;k:
Thus
rit+1
rjt+1
=
Aijt+1=B
ij
t+1
Ajit+1=B
ji
t+1
;
where
Aijt+1 :=
KX
k=1
[t+1
j
t+1;k + (1  t+1)Rt+1;k]Cijt;k;
Bijt+1 := 1 + t+1
KX
k=1
(jt+1;k   it+1;k)Cijt;k:
Observe that Bjit+1 = B
ij
t+1. Indeed,
Bijt+1  Bjit+1 = t+1
KX
k=1
[(jt+1;k   it+1;k)Cijt;k   (it+1;k   jt+1;k)Cjit;k] =
t+1
KX
k=1
(jt+1;k   it+1;k) = 0
because Cijt;k + C
ji
t;k = 1. Consequently,
r1t+1
r2t+1
=
A12t+1
A21t+1
=
r1t
r2t
PK
k=1[t+1
2
t+1;k + (1  t+1)Rt+1;k]
1t;k
1t;kr
1
t =r
2
t + 
2
t;kPK
k=1[t+1
1
t+1;k + (1  t+1)Rt+1;k]
2t;k
1t;kr
1
t =r
2
t + 
2
t;k
;
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which yields (25). 
Proof of Proposition 5: By virtue of (18), we have
Et(t+1

t+1;k) = Et(t+1Et+1
1X
l=1
lt+1Rt+1+l;k) =
Et(Et+1
1X
l=1
t+1
l
t+1Rt+1+l;k) = Et(
1X
l=1
t+1
l
t+1Rt+1+l;k);
and so
Et[t+1

t+1;k+(1 t+1)Rt+1;k] = Et[
1X
l=1
t+1
l
t+1Rt+1+l;k+(1 t+1)Rt+1;k] =
Et(
1X
l=1
l+1t Rt+l+1;k + 
1
tRt+1;k) = Et
1X
l=1
ltRt+l;k = 

t;k
because 1  t+1 = 1t and
l+1t = t+1t+2::::t+l(1  t+l+1) = t+1lt+1
for l  1. 
Proof of Lemma 1: From formula (25) with 1t;k = 

t;k and 
2
t;k = t;k,
we get
KX
k=1
[t+1

t+1;k + (1  t+1)Rt+1;k]
t;k
t;kzt + t;k
=
KX
k=1
[t+1
t+1;k
zt+1
+ (1  t+1)Rt+1;k
zt+1
]
t;kzt
t;kzt + t;k
:
By using the notation ykt = t;k=zt and the fact that jytj = 1=zt, we write
KX
k=1
[t+1

t+1;k + (1  t+1)Rt+1;k]
ykt
t;k + y
k
t
=
KX
k=1
[t+1y
k
t+1 + (1  t+1)Rt+1;kjyt+1j]
t;k
t;k + y
k
t
;
29
which implies
t+1
KX
k=1
t;ky
k
t+1   t+1;kykt
t;k + y
k
t
+ (1  t+1)
KX
k=1
Rt+1;k
t;kjyt+1j   ykt
t;k + y
k
t
= 0: (45)
We have
t;ky
k
t+1   t+1;kykt
t;k + y
k
t
= t+1;k
ykt+1=

t+1;k   ykt =t;k
1 + ykt =

t;k
=
t+1;k(
1 + ykt+1=

t+1;k
1 + ykt =

t;k
  1)  t+1;k ln
1 + ykt+1=

t+1;k
1 + ykt =

t;k
; (46)
where the last relation follows from the inequality a   1  ln a (a > 0). By
using (46) and the same inequality, we nd
KX
k=1
t;ky
k
t+1   t+1;kykt
t;k + y
k
t

KX
k=1
t+1;k[ln(1 +
ykt+1
t+1;k
)  ln(1 + y
k
t
t;k
)] =
KX
k=1
t+1;k(Zt+1;k   Zt;k) = Zt+1  
KX
k=1
t+1;kZt;k: (47)
Further, we have
t;kjyt+1j   ykt
t;k + y
k
t
=
t;kjyt+1j+ t;k
t;k + y
k
t
  1 
ln
t;kjyt+1j+ t;k
t;k + y
k
t
= ln
jyt+1j+ 1
1 + ykt =

t;k
;
and so
KX
k=1
Rt+1;k
t;kjyt+1j   ykt
t;k + y
k
t

KX
k=1
Rt+1;k ln
1 + jyt+1j
1 + ykt =

t;k
=
ln(1 + jyt+1j) 
KX
k=1
Rt+1;k ln(1 + y
k
t =

t;k) = Yt+1  
KX
k=1
Rt+1;kZt;k
(see (28) and (29)), which yields
KX
k=1
Rt+1;k
t;kjyt+1j   ykt
t;k + y
k
t
 Yt+1  
KX
k=1
Rt+1;kZt;k: (48)
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By combining (45), (47) and (48), we nd
0  t+1(Zt+1  
KX
k=1
t+1;kZt;k) + (1  t+1)(Yt+1  
KX
k=1
Rt+1;kZt;k) =
t+1Zt+1 + (1  t+1)Yt+1  
KX
k=1
[t+1

t+1;k + (1  t+1)Rt+1;k]Zt;k:
which proves (31). 
Proof of Lemma 2: To prove the rst relation in (32) we proceed as
follows:
Ut = Yt   Zt =   ln r1t  
KX
k=1
t;k ln[1 +
r2tt;k
r1t

t;k
] =
KX
k=1
t;k ln
1
r1t
+
KX
k=1
t;k ln
r1t

t;k
r1t

t;k + r
2
tt;k
=
KX
k=1
t;k ln
t;k
r1t

t;k + r
2
tt;k
:
The last relation in (32) follows from the elementary inequality
PK
k=1 ak ln ak PK
k=1 ak ln bk  0, which is presented in a somewhat rened form in Lemma
5. 
Proof of Lemma 3: It is clear that t  0. By taking the conditional
expectation Et() of both sides of inequality (31) and using (26), we obtain
Ett+1 
KX
k=1
Zt;kEt[t+1

t+1;k + (1  t+1)Rt+1;k] =
KX
k=1
Zt;k

t;k = Zt: (49)
In view of (30), we get
Ett+1 + (1  t)Ut  Zt + (1  t)Yt   (1  t)Zt =
tZt + (1  t)Yt = t ;
which proves (34). Thus Ett+1  t   (1   t)Ut  t because Ut  0 (see
Lemma 2). The last inequality implies Et  E0 = 0 < +1. Since t  0,
we have Ejtj <1, and so t is a supermartingale. 
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Proof of Lemma 4: The random variables t := t   Et t+1 are non-
negative by the denition of a supermartingale. Further, we have
T 1X
t=0
Et =
T 1X
t=0
(Et   Et+1) = E0   ET ;
and so the sequence
PT 1
t=0 E t is bounded because supT ( ET ) =  infT E T <
+1. Therefore the series of the expectationsP1t=0E t of the non-negative
random variables t converges, which implies
P1
t=0 t < 1 a.s. because
E
P1
t=0 t =
P1
t=0E t (the last equality holds for any sequence t  0). 
Proof of Lemma 5: We have lnx  x   1, which implies (lnx)=2 =
ln
p
x  px  1, and so   lnx  2  2px. By using this inequality, we get
KX
k=1
ak(ln ak   ln bk) =  
KX
k=1
ak ln
bk
ak

KX
k=1
ak(2  2
p
bkp
ak
) =
2  2
KX
k=1
p
akbk =
KX
k=1
(ak   2
p
akbk + bk) =
KX
k=1
(
p
ak  
p
bk)
2:
This yields (35) because (
p
a pb)2  (a  b)2=4 for 0  a; b  1. 
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